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FREE PRESS v. FAIR TRIAL:
A CONTINUING DIALOGUE
'Trial By Newspaper' And The Social Sciences
DONALD M. GILLMOR*
I don't think we can solve our problem by shouting
"free speech" and "fair trial" at each other. I think what
we need is an impartial scientific investigation of this subject
by an impartial agency, an agency of such stature that both
the Bar and the media would respect it.'
A review of court opinion bearing upon the collision of competing
constitutional rights, free press and fair trial, although it tells us
what the law is and suggests what it ought to be, still leaves the
central and essential question unanswered: what is the effect of
trial and pre-trial publicity on jurors?
The legal profession has built its case against "trial by news-
paper" without ever testing the premise that there is a direct cause-
effect relationship between press reports and jury verdicts. Not
even the most positivistic school of jurisprudence, with its insistence
upon the application of scientific method to problems of law, has
taken steps toward anchoring this particular problem on the solid
foundation of empirical fact and defining it within an adequate
conceptual framework.
Under the influence of such thinkers as Weber and Pound legal
research no longer enjoys that majestic isolation of a half century
ago; and Lord Coke's "special logic" of the law is today hardly a
sufficient analytical tool. In fact, the more recent work of Pritchett
and Schubert2 may portend a revolution in legal research which
will push the law well beyond the logical limits now set by its own
postulates, will assimilate the objective realities of the present, and
will further loosen the bonds of stare decisis.8 Rule logicians must
not be permitted to reduce law to a kind of legal geometry which
ignores the human variables.4 "The life of the law [is] experience,"
said Justice Holmes, 5 and that experience is inevitably human.
* Professor of Journalism and Coordinator of Honors, University of North Dakota.
B.A. 1949, Manitoba; M.A. 1950, Ph.D. 1961, Minnesota.
1. Tilnkham, Pair Trial and Freedom of the Press, 19 F.R.D. 16, 25 (1957).
2. PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948) ; SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1963) ; SCHUBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS (1960); JUDICIAL DE-
CISION MAKING (Schubert ed. 1963).
3. See articles by Brown, Becker, Aubert, Ulmer, and Winick in FRONTIERS OF LEGAL
RESEARCH, The American Behavioral Scientist, Dec., 1963.
4. Schur, Scientific Method and the Criminal Trial Decision, 25 SOCIAL RESEARCH
175 (1958).
5. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (30th ed. 1938).
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The late Jerome Frank recounts in his coruscating book, Courts
on Trial, how the dead hand of precedent may stunt the growth of
the law: in 1947 two enterprising, able and earnest law students
sought to study first-hand how jurors decide cases. Their plan was
to have trial judges, after a jury trial had concluded, ask the jurors
to volunteer to fill out a carefully worded questionnaire, and, if they
cared to, to allow themselves to be interviewed by the students. The
proposal was made without success to nine judges of several different
jurisdictions. One federal judge said that he did not approve a "holier-
than-thou attitude toward juries," and that the project could serve
"no worthy end" but would only increase differences among federal
judges concerning the value of the jury system. Another, in refusing
his co-operation, stated that he had never made such a study when
he was in law school. Still another federal judge, unwilling to have
jurors interrogated, said, "How they decide is their business." Two
state court judges deemed the undertaking "improper." But another
state court judge, enthusiastic about the study, submitted the ques-
tionnaire to the jurors in a case and gave the written answers to the
students. He also granted them permission to conduct informal
interviews, but reneged when he received adverse criticism from
some of his colleagues.8
In the great reform movement which swept the common law
in the nineteenth century the utilitarians sought to illuminate judicial
processes. Rules, once thought to have been pronouncements from
on high, were traced back to their operational origins. How the law
works (the "living" law) rather than what it is (the positive law)
became the primary consideration. Jeremy Bentham, for example,
in his most important work, presents a most realistic appraisal of
the probable influence of extraneous publication on judge and jury:7
In England, publications of the cases of litigant parties
are altogether unusual, and, if distributed for any such
purpose as that of influencing the decision of the jury, would
be liable to be treated on the footing of an offence against
justice . . . . In England, the ground for the prohibition put
upon these ex parte publications, is the danger of their exer-
cising an undue influence on the minds of the jury . ... On
6. The reluctance of the courts to comply with such requests is justified in McDonald
v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-268 (1915), where the court said, in part: "When the
affidavit of a juror, as to the misconduct of himself or the other members of the Jury.
is made the basis of a motion for a new trial the court must choose between redressing
the injury of the private litigant and inflicting the public injury which would result ifjurors were permitted to testify as to what had happened in the jury room. . . . But let
it once be . . . established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned into court
can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those who took part in their publication
and all verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in the hope of
discovering something which might invalidate the finding. Jurors would be harassed and
beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which
might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured
could be thus used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private
deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation-to the destruction of all frank-
ness and freedom of discussion and conference."
7. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 604 (1827).
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professional and cultivated minds, engaged by the necessity
of office to procure the whole mass of evidence and argument,
the premature exhibition of a part would rather be turned
aside from as useless, than apprehended by anybody as
dangerous. It was to the eye of the public at large, and not to
the eye of ... a judge that these statements were addressed.
In what way could the probity of the judge be endangered
by receiving at one time a part of those documents, the whole
of which would come before him of course? Even in England,
the reason on which the prohibition relies for its support has
more of surface than of substance in it. The representations
given by publications of this sort will of course be partial
ones: the colour given to them will be apt to be inflamma-
tory: the judgment of a jury will be apt to be deceived,
and their affections engaged on the wrong side. Partial?
Yes: but can anything in these printed arguments be more
partial than the viva voce oratory of the advocates on that
same side will be sure to be. The dead letter cannot avoid
allowing full time for reflection: the viva voce declamation
allows of none. The written arguments may contain allega-
tions without proofs: true: but is not the spoken argument
just as apt to do the same? When, of the previous statement
given by the leading advocate, any part remains unsupported
by evidence, the judge of course points out the failure:
whatever effect this indication has on the jury, in the way
guarding them against that source of delusion in spoken
arguments, would it have less efficacy in the case of written
ones?
Compare this with the superficial verbiage of less cautious
commentators. An English jurist declares: 8 "It is the pride of the
constitution of this country that all causes should be decided by
jurors, who are chosen in a manner which excludes all possibility
of bias." (emphasis added) And Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting
opinion in the Stroble case notes that:9 "Science with all its ad-
vances has not given us instruments for determining when the
impact of such newspaper exploitation has spent itself or whether
the powerful impression bound to be made by such inflaming articles
as here preceded the trial can be dissipated in the mind of the
average juror by the tame often pedestrian proceedings in court."
(emphasis added) Such conclusions obviate the necessity of applying
scientific methods to the examination of social and constitutional
conflicts.
Another judge admits that when a decision was difficult he would
rely primarily on "the hunch-that intuitive flash of understanding
which makes the jump-spark connection between question and
decision, and at the point where the path is darkest for the judicial
8. . v. Jolllffe, 4 T.R. 286, 100 Eng. Rep. 1022 (KB. 1787).
9. Stroble V. California, 343 U.S. 181, 201 (1952).
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feet, sheds its light along the way."10 If "hunch" is the mental
mechanism of the process by which judges reach decisions, can we
expect legally untrained jurors to bring any degree of objectivity to
their deliberations?
If with Dean Pound we accept the view that there is much in
law which is social engineering, it would seem to follow that the
accumulated knowledge and methodology of the social sciences would
be helpful in solving legal problems and in providing legislators with
the facts of social life. Much of the substance of law is drawn from
sources outside the law itself, and few valid conclusions with regard
to the function of law can be reached by depending solely upon
legal theory. Moreover, "the basis of any significant critique of
the law must be how successfully the law actually works to achieve
social ends which are desired for reasons not found in the law
itself."1 1 Pound says it well: 12
A principle gets the value as a starting point for legal
reasoning from its possibility of fruitful application to actual
conditions involved in litigation in the time and place. If
it is limited, by its definition or by one imposed upon its
interpretation, to exact meaning of words or conditions of
fact which were current or existed or as they were understood
when it was formulated, it loses its value for the purposes
of a principle and becomes a rule. This defeats its end
since a rule is fitted to precisely defined facts which may
no longer obtain. Reason may be universal. But if the
reasoning that is needed in order to apply the principle is
tied to conditions which no longer exist nothing if left but idle
and mischievous abstraction.
It should be recognized, of course, that the goal of judicial
processes is not always knowledge, and that the search for "truth"
is frequently suppressed by the need for victory in an adversary
system. In making decisions the judge recognizes (1) that the case
must be decided one way or another, whether or not the evidence
is sufficient for a "scientific" conclusion; (2) that judicial fact-
finders are not bound by rules of consistency, and (3) that facts
may be bent by the judicial process to serve an ulterior purpose Is
This is not to suggest that all members of the legal profession
are blind to the value of scientific method in judicial fact-finding or
that lawyers conspire to subvert "truth." It does suggest, however,
that the conventional logic of the law, with its dependence upon
analogy, is an inadequate and naive method when the law reaches
out to other disciplines to justify legislation or legal reform. One
10. Hutcheson, The Judgment Initiative: The Function of the 'Hunch' in Judicial
Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278 (1949).
11. Simpson & Field, Law and the Social Sciences, 32 VA. L. Rsv. 855, 862 (1946).
12. POUND, LAW FINDING THROUGH EXPERIENCE AND REASON 68 (1960).
18. Ulmer, OV. cit. aupra note 3, at 22,
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lawyer admonishes his profession that it may better boast of its
maturity and sophistication when it seeks the counsel of the sociolo-
gist and psychologist in solving the problems of publicity, the cause
celebre, and the jury. 14
And until it does, the free press-fair trial conflict will remain
simply an issue of passionate speculation. To what extent do juries
have any prior knowledge of the cases on which they sit, and what
proportion of such knowledge is derived from news coverage? If
the media do impinge upon the trial process, what is the degree of
their influence and at what point in a trial is prejudicial publicity
most deeply felt?15 What is the effect upon jurors of news reports
of (a) confessions; (b) prior criminal records; (c) expressions of
opinions concerning the guilt or innocence of an accused; (d) inter-
views with the family of a victim; (e) the anticipated testimony
of witnesses; (f) and statements that appeal to racial, religious,
political or economic bias? Is the juror conscious of the effect of
such reports upon him: and do his own composite predispositions
override any amount of press comment? How effective are judicial
instructions to a jury? Do such procedural remedies as change of
venue, change of venire, continuance, and mistrial serve to diminish
prejudice? Does locking up a juror until the termination of a trial
further prejudice him against a defendant? Are there positive effects
of publicity which may counterbalance possible negative effects;
and to what extent do rumor and gossip assume the role of the
press where the press is censored or restricted? Finally, do we
accept Wigmore's view that "to equate the stamina of judges and
jurors runs counter to one of the basic assumptions of the law of
evidence-that jurors must be protected from the undue prejudice of
improper evidence upon which, however, the judge may safely pass;"
or shall we agree with the appellate court opinion in the Baltimore
Radio6 case that there are citizens possessing the same firmness
and impartiality as judges?
WHAT WE Do KNOW
Because of its dramatic role and its central importance in the
trial process, the American jury has been the focal point of a number
of pioneering social scientific investigations. By far the most signifi-
cant of these was the University of Chicago Law School Jury Project
which sought to apply the methods of the behavioral sciences to a
14. Goldfarb, Public Information, Criminal Trials and the Cause Celebre, 36 N.Y.U.L.Rsv. 810, 838 (1961).15. Murphy & Newcombe In EXPERMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHoLOGY 961 (rev. ed. 1937),suggest that news reports immediately before or at the beginning of trial proceedingsare most effective because of the lack of counter propaganda and specific knowledge. "Thetruth of the matter Is that preJudice Is more likely to occur at the trial than either be-fore or after." Scott, State Criminal Procedure, The Fourteenth Amendment and Preju-dice 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 319, 331 (1954).
Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. State, 191 X4I, 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949).
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systematic study of the modern jury. Directed by Harry Kalven Jr.,
Hans Zeisel and Fred Strodtbeck, the project was sponsored by the
Ford Foundation.
Jury Project collected basic data on jury behavior through
statistical analysis and refinement of existing court records, public
opinion surveys, questionnaires, observation of jury behavior through
post-deliberation interviews, simulated cases before experimental
juries, and the recording of a limited number of actual jury deliber-
ations. Public opinion surveys were used to determine individual
attitudes toward the jury system. Other phases of the study sought
to analyze the methods of jury selection and the segments of the
population serving on them. Trained observers were assigned to a
series of jury trials to witness the trial, to interview the judge and
counsel, and with the consent of the court, to interview the jury
panel at the end of the trial. Also with the approval of the court
and counsel for both sides, six actual jury deliberations were re-
corded, the primary purpose of which was to prove or disprove the
authenticity of the other investigative methods. 17
Among the over-all purposes of the study were the following:
(a) to determine to what extent the jury conceives of its function in
the same way that the formal law conceives it; (b) to determine if
the jury comprehends the judge's instructions; (c) to see if the jury's
criteria for a verdict are consistent with those laid down by the
law; (d) to see if the jury comprehends the evidence; and (e) to
determine if the jury is moved by "rational" or emotional factors
rooted in personality, social background, and the social situation of
the courtroom, jury box and jury chambers.
As part of this study, 1500 jurors who had served in 213 different
criminal cases in Chicago and Brooklyn were subjected to intensive
interviewing. Among the findings was the fact that in thirty per
cent of the cases the jurors were unanimous on the first ballot; and
in seventy per cent of the cases there was some division of opinion
on the first ballot, but in ninety per cent of these cases the majority
on the first ballot always won its point. The board conclusion is that
most criminal cases are decided during the trial and not during the
jury deliberations. 8
A somewhat similar conclusion was reached by Weld and Danzig
in an earlier study conducted at the Cornell University Law School.
Here law students were used as counsel and psychology students as
jurors in a moot court setting carefully designed to create the "real"
atmosphere of a trial. Unlike an actual trial, the jurors were not
17. Ferguson, Legal Research on Trial, 39 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 78 (1955).
18. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744, 747 (1959).
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examined for their competence or impartiality, and, of course, they
were not subjected to any pre-trial publicity.
The trial was divided into stages and the jury members were
asked to indicate their degree of belief in guilt or innocence at each
stage in the proceedings, recording their opinions before all of the
evidence was heard. It was noted that their judgments fluctuated
considerably throughout the proceedings. It was observed also that
individuals reacted differently to the same testimony and that judg-
ments were often affected by admiration for or antagonism toward
the counselors. Even these jurors, superior in intelligence and
education, did not reach decisions through a logical analysis of the
case, and no juror in the study attempted to maintain an attitude of
doubt on the theory that he should make no decision until he had
heard all of the evidence. Juror judgments tended to fluctuate
with the presentation of the testimony favoring one side or the other.
Early in the trial at least twenty-five per cent of the jurors
reached a fairly definite decision-less by the proof than by their
notion of what under the circumstances seemed to them "right" or
just' 0-and thereafter the effect of the testimony was merely to
change their certainty. In this regard, the opening and closing
statements of the attorneys were important.
There was strong evidence that the jurors had reached their
verdict before going into the jury room. Only one of the forty-one
jurors changed his mind during the jury deliberations.
It would appear that jurors brought to the trial personal standard
of evaluation, and where an attorney possessed sufficient prestige,
some members of the jury would accept his opinion and maintain
it as their own.2 0
In another segment of the Jury Project itself, 500 trial judges
cooperated in filling out a questionnaire for each jury trial over
which they had presided. Fifteen hundred criminal case question-
naires were returned. In eighty-three per cent of these cases the
judge and the jury agreed on the verdict and in seventeen per cent
there was disagreement. Judges, however, appeared more prone
to convict than jurors, and if all defendants in the 1500 cases had
been tried by a judge, the number of acquittals would have been
cut in half. 21
19. A similar conclusion is reached by Judge Bernard Botein In TRIAL JUDGE 179
(1952): "Sometimes, jurors will follow a judge's charge on the law if it squares with
their own particular home brew of the law to reach what they consider a just or sensi-ble result."
20. Weld & Danzig, A Study of the Way in Which a Verdict is Reached by a Jury,
53 AM. J. OF PSYcHoLoGY 518 (1940).
21. Brooder, op. cit. a8upra note 18, at 750.
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In a detailed study of the differences in decisions of juries and
judges in personal injury suits, it was found that the percentage
of agreement between judge and jury remained almost constant
whether or not written instructions were given the jury, whether
or not the judge summarized the evidence, and whether or not the
judge commented on the weight of the evidence. There is a strong
suggestion here that at least in personal injury suits these procedural
controls make the jury neither more nor less like the judge. 22
Edwin Schur observes that theoretically the selection of jurors
is geared to selecting value-free persons, and any opinion on the
case or the type of problem involved may serve to disqualify the
prospective juror. But he adds: 8 "Actually, of course, we know
that the selection proceeds on radically different grounds, each
attorney scrupulously dedicated to the selection of those jurors whose
value systems will most favor his client's cause." Jury Project noted
that sixty per cent of the lawyers' voir dire time *as spent in
indoctrinating jurors and only forty per cent in asking questions
designated to separate the favorable from the unfavorable jurors.24
Strodtbeck, another participant in the Jury Project investigations,
also sought to evaluate the importance of sex role differentiation
and social status in jury deliberations. 5 Jurors drawn by lot from
the regular jury pools of Chicago and St. Louis courts were exposed
to recorded trials, were asked to deliberate under the customary
discipline of the bailiffs of the court, and return their verdicts. The
deliberations were recorded with hidden microphones. Twelve ses-
sions out of an original set of thirty in which jurors considered an
auto negligence case were scored in terms of group interaction
categories. The scorer listened to each fully transcribed deliberation
and had available indications of non-verbal gestures made by an
original observer. The consistency of each scorer was checked
before the scoring began and re-checked periodically while the scor-
ing was in process. The number of verbal acts originated by each
juror in each category was then counted. Analysis indicated that
men dominate jury deliberations, that is, they initiate long bursts
of talking directed at the achievement of a verdict, and women are
more likely to react emotionally to the contributions of others.
In studies conducted in Chicago, St. Louis and Minneapolis,
jurors were drawn by a random process from voting registration
lists. The usual bias from the fact that lawyers, doctors, teachers,
policemen and local and federal employees are excused, and aliens,
22. Id. at 751.
23. Schur, op. cit. eupra note 4, at 182.
24. Broeder, op. cit. supra note 18 at 753.
25. Strodtbeck & Mann, Sexe Role biferentiation in Jury Deliberation 19 SOCIoMETRY 3(1956) ; Strodtbeck, James & Hawkins, Social Status in Jury Deliberations, 22 AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL RKV. 718 (1957).
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foreign visitors, migrants, and persons under twenty-one years of
age do not appear on jury lists, was taken into account, the net
effect being that the professions and the very low education and
occupation groups are slightly under-represented.
This evaluation of social status in jury deliberations noted at
the outset that in the jury situation there is not only the widespread
opinion among group members that they should act toward one
another as equals but also the reinforcement of the presumption of
equality by the requirement that the verdict be unanimous. The
latent premise of the study was that high participation in the verdict-
reaching process indicates a greater ability to influence others.
The findings indicated that men in contrast with women and
persons of higher in contrast with lower status occupations had
higher participation, influence, satisfaction and perceived compe-
tence for the jury task. Jurors who used more of the group's limited
time together were perceived by respondents to be the jurors they
would choose if they were on trial. Whatever the criteria used by
the groups to regulate the contribution of their members, these
criteria were broadly held. The fact that some people did most of
the talking did not prevent the achievement of a consensus. Again,
this study suggests the continuity of status in the jury situation.
Certainly the most ambitious, the most elegantly designed, and
what was to become the most controversial aspect of Jury Project
was the recordings made of real jury deliberations in the spring of
1954 in a federal courtroom in Wichita, Kansas. With the full know-
ledge and consent of the judge and attorneys in a civil action, but
unknown to the jurymen, a microphone was concealed in the jury
chamber. In the interests of furthering legal knowledge, the re-
cordings, though inconclusive, were played back to two hundred
members of the bar at the annual Judicial Conference of the Tenth
Judicial Circuit at Estes Park, Colorado, in July, 1955.
DIFFICULTIES OF JURY RESEARCH
There were no protests at this point. But three months later a
story in the Los Angeles Times on the "bugging" of the Wichita
jury room set off a nationwide outcry. Jury Project was condemned
by editors, columnists and radio commentators. The Senate Sub-
committee on Internal Security, chaired by Senator James 0. East-
land of Mississippi and Senator William E. Jenner of Indiana,
investigated with the avowed intention of seeking legislation to
prevent the further use of concealed microphones. Some members
of the Subcommittee even called for legal action against the re-
searchers and everyone involved in the project, from the Ford
Foundation to the consenting judges and lawyers. "The fact that
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the persons who made the recordings were competent social scientists
pursuing a serious study of an important American institution ap-
peared to make no difference to the critics. ' 26 Few lawyers appeared
to be overtly disturbed by this research, and some prominent legal
figures publicly endorsed it.27 In a letter to the Subcommittee,
Dean Levi of the University of Chicago Law School said: 2 8
The use of a limited number of actual jury deliberations
can contribute to the better understanding of the jury and
to the improvement in instructions. By serving to validate
other means of study, it can serve to improve the adminis-
tration of justice so far as the rules of evidence are concerned
and the speed with which trials are secured or conducted.
It can serve to maintain and to continue a great American
institution. This is no doubt the reason that there are dis-
tinguished and able leaders of the bar who are in favor of
such a study, including the use of a limited number of actual
jury deliberations under proper safeguards.
The courts would seem to have mixed feelings about this practice.
In one federal case the court said: 29
If jurors are conscious that they will be subjected to
interrogation or searching hostile inquiry as to what occurred
in the jury room and why, they are almost inescapably
influenced to some extent by that anticipated annoyance.
The courts will not permit that potential influence to invade
the jury room. He who makes studied inquiries of jurors
as to what occurred there acts at his peril, lest he be held
as acting in obstruction of the administration of justice.
(emphasis added)
A few years later another federal court affirmed this position: 0 "We
do hold for future guidance that it is improper and unethical for
lawyers, court attaches or judges in a particular case to make
public the transactions in the jury room or to interview jurors to
discover what was the course of deliberation of a jury trial." The
American Civil Liberties Union has also favored tightly closed jury
rooms.
Noting that there was no provision of state law or constitution
26. Burchard, Lawyers, Political Scientists, Sociologists-and Concealed Microphones,
23 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REv. 686 (1958).
27. The courts had earlier engaged in this practice. In 1938, the Ruth Commission of
Pennsylvania, armed with authority to subpoena, placed scores of ex-jurors on the stand
and asked them to testify as to what really happens in a jury deliberation. Several ex-
jurors admitted under oath that they had rendered a verdict without knowing the dis-
tinction between plaintiff and defendant. In the late 1940's, District Judge Lee Loevinger
of Ramsey County, Minnesota, distributed questionaires to jurors at the end of a trial.
More than 800 were returned.
28. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, Preliminary Report, Oct. 12 & 13, 1955, cited in Ferguson, op. cit. supra
note 17, at 82.
29. Rakes v. United States, 169 F.2d 739, 745-46 (2d Cir. 1948).
30. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Mely, 219 F.2d 199, 202 (9th Cir. 1954).
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establishing the inviolability of the jury room, a Michigan court
took the opposite view: 81
Just as physicians observe a living patient for research
purposes, the improvement of the administration of justice
necessitates the limited use of direct observation .... If the
general practice of medicine and surgery is to progress,
there must be a certain amount of experimentation carried
on; but such experiments must be done with the knowledge
and consent of the patient or those responsible for him, and
must not vary too radically from the accepted method of
procedure.
Another judge has recommended that a stenographic record be made
of the jurors' discussions while they are deliberating so that the
trial judge with such a record before him could learn, to some
extent, whether the verdict was reached by improper means; if so
he would set aside the verdict.8 2
It should be noted that few social scientists came to the defense
of their colleagues, nor was there much public support for the project.
Max Radin, in a prophetic statement, had said in 1940:83 "As far as
trial by battle is concerned, the lay public loves to consider a trial
as a 'battle of wits' and would probably resent in any case that
aroused its interest an objective and careful scientific study of the
data." 84
THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY
Jury Project did not deal specifically with the question of
measuring the impact of newspaper publicity on the jury. In a letter
to Judge Herbert F. Goodrich, director of the American Law Insti-
tute, Harry Kalven, Jr., co-ordinator of Jury Project, assessed that
problem: 5
Our materials as to the impact of newspaper publicity
on the jury are even less satisfactory. As a matter of
31. Fortner v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 261 N.W. 762, 765 (1935).
32. Galston, Civil Jury Trials and Tribulations, 29 A.B.A.J. 195 (1943).
33. RADIN, LAW AS LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE 55 (1940).
34. As a follow-up study to the press outburst, Waldo Burchard sent '300 question-
aires to each of three groups of sociologists, political scientists and lawyers. The ques-
tionnaires contained seventy propositions relating to juries, jury studies, and use of
concealed devices in jury research and social science research in general. His findings
indicated that political scientists and sociologists by a large majority would approve the
use of concealed devices in jury research and, by implication, in social scientific research
in general. Lawyers were evenly divided in approving and disapproving. Although Burch-
ard suggsts that all three groups were at variance with editors and comnientators, it
does not appear from his report that the latter groups were adequetly polled. Burchard
concludes: "What is needed most of all . . . are practical demonstrations of the bene-
ficial effects of social research. Unfortunately, there are many cases, of which the jury
study is one, where it is extremely difficult, if not impossible to demonstrate such effects.
And in a field where tradition is strong, unless the utility of scientific knowledge can be
readily established, tradition continues to hold sway." Burchard, op. cit. supra note 26,
at 690.
35. Letter from Harry Kalven, Jr. to Hon. Herbert F. Goodrich, Director of the
American Law Institute, Sept. 16, 1940 (with a copy to the author).
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prudence we decided not to interview in major criminal
cases where there was trial by newspaper. And we have
been unable to think of a way of importing the stimulus of
the news to our experimental jury routine. As a result the
vast majority of the cases we have studied simply do not
present the problem of the newspaper. We do, however,
have evidence that the jurors take with surprising serious-
ness the admonition not to read the paper or to discuss the
case with other people . . . . Our over-all impression . . . is
that the jury is a pretty stubborn, healthy institution not
likely to be overwhelmed either by a remark of counsel or
a remark in the press. The chief reason for this is that in
most cases the jurors are initially in some disagreement
and there are champions for both sides of the case in the
jury room. Thus a prejudicial remark which is likely to
please one side is equally likely to irritate the other and
would be offset by counter-argument. But this is unfortun-
ately only a general impression. . . . (emphasis added)
Two obstacles to the comprehensive study of the effects of pre-trial
publicity on jurors are implicit in this excerpt: an adequate method-
ology has not yet been developed; and the judiciary has provided
no assurance that it will approve of such research.
As a member of Jury Project, Dale Broeder was principally
responsible for the observation of a series of twenty jury trials and
the intensive court-approved interviewing of the jurors who served
in them. These interviews were conducted as soon as possible after
the trial. The average interview lasted one and one-half hours and
a considerable number lasted for three hours or more. In all, 225
individual jurors were interviewed. Thirteen of the cases were per-
sonal injury actions, and seven were criminal cases. Of this phase
of the research Broeder says:3 6 "The central problem with such
an undertaking . . . is that all of these cases are different; and,
further, that twenty cases is not very many cases. Obviously one
cannot produce findings from such data which are statistically
significant. But while no conclusive answers can be provided by
the technique it has at least given us some worthwhile insights."
A few isolated field studies, which are at least tangential to the
free press-fair trial question, have been made in recent years. A
public opinion survey taken by Cornelius Du Bois, Inc., a New York
public relations firm, was attached to the motion of Alger Hiss for
a change of venue on the grounds of newspaper-fostered prejudice
in New York City. Of the New Yorkers questioned, 45.1 per cent
said they had formed opinions on the guilt or innocence of Hiss,
compared to only 33.8 per cent of those interviewed in Rutland,
Vermont, to where Hiss sought to have his second trial removed.
36. Brooder, op. oft. aupra note 18, at 756.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
But there were unexpected results. In New York, 21.8 per cent of
the interview sample believed Hiss to be guilty; 12.1 per cent thought
him innocent: in Rutland, 23.1 per cent thought him guilty; only 5.9
per cent thought him innocent. The fact that less coverage of the
case and less anti-Hiss press sentiment occurred in Rutland did not
support the asserted conclusion that trial there would be more fair.
"Apparently, the conservative predisposition of Vermonters was more
effective in setting public opinion against Hiss than hostile newspaper
publicity in New York. ' 3 7
In 1953, Elmo Roper applied scientific principles to a legal issue.
He was engaged by the NAACP to learn by a public opinion poll
whether prejudice against a Negro, accused of the rape of a white
woman, 8 was running higher in the Florida county in which the
trial was scheduled than it was in three surrounding counties. Roper
concluded that the atmosphere would be more temperate in the
other counties and his findings were submitted with an application
for a change of venue. But the court refused to consider this "new-
fangled" approach to legal questions, characterizing the results of
the survey as "hearsay."3 9
A different approach to the problem of "trial by newspaper" is
suggested by a content analysis which sought to measure p r e s s
performance in the 1948 Condon controversy.4 0 Dr. Edward U. Con-
don, director of the National Bureau of Standards, had been de-
nounced by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Almost
simultaneously he was cleared by the Department of Commerce
under which his agency was established. Soon, however, he was the
center of a tempest involving other Congressional committees, two
executive departments, the FBI, learned, scientific, and juristic
societies, eminent personages, and even the President of the United
States. Subsequently, the Atomic Energy Commission attested to
Condon's loyalty and he was cleared for access to restricted data.
The study focused on the press of New York City for an eight-
month period covering the time from the original denunciation to
37. Note. Contempt by Publication, 59 YALE L.J. 534, 543 (1950). The same writer
says that the effect of inflammatory reporting in large metropolitan communities, whereit is most likely to occur, is especially open to question. The daily sensations that are
repeated to a sophisticated population are seldom remembered. Judges in these com-
munities find that the continuous succession of sensational reporting "in the end produce
no impression. It is a common experience in the most notorious cases to meet a succession
of talesmen who have read nothing of the matter, and an even more frequent occurrence
to encounter those who can recall nothing of what they have read." People v. Broady,
195 Misc. 349, 90 N.Y.S.2d 864 (1949). Of course, the validity and reliability of the
recall tests used as a basis for this statement may be open to question.
88. Irvin v. State, 66 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1953), cert. den., 346 U.S. 927 (1954), rehearing
den., 347 U.S. 914 (1954).
39. Irvin v. State ibid. is discussed in Spingarn, Newspapers and the Pursuit of Justice,Saturday Review, April 1, 1954, p. 9, and in Goldfarb, op. cit. supra note 14, at 837.For a discussion illustrating that all judges and lawyers do not think this way, see Note,
Public Opinion Surveys as Etdence: The Pollsters Go to Court, 16 HAnv. L. RSW. 498
(1953), and JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. COURTS, HANDBOOK OF PROCEDURE FOR THE
TRIAL OF PROTRACTED CASES (1960).
40. Mlapper & Glock, Trial by Newspaper, 180 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 16 (1949).
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the final clearance of Condon. The verbal and pictorial content
referring to the subject was classified according to objective criteria
and rendered susceptible to statistical description.
Without attempting to interpret their findings, the researchers
concluded that, taking the New York press as a whole, there was a
preponderance of statements favorable to Condon. There was a wide
variation among the nine newspapers-in their treatment of the case,
four appearing to be favorable to him and five unfavorable. Back-
ground material revived for use in the running news stories had the
effect of building up the case against him by restating the original
charges. All newspapers reported the House Committee's promise
to give the accused scientist a hearing far more often than they
reported its failure to do so.
In a much less complex content analysis, Martin Millspaugh4 l
examined references made to the accused in four Baltimore news-
papers at the time of the famous Baltimore Radio42 case. James,
a Negro, had been accused and allegedly had confessed to the murder
of a little white girl. Three papers, which based their circulations
on white readers, presented the case in terms deemed by the investi-
gator destructive to James, while the one Afro-American newspaper
stressed the mitigating background facts in a manner helpful to the
cause of the defendant. The newspapers would appear to have been
reinforcing already existing predispositions in both white and Negro
communities.
CURRENT COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH
The free press-fair trial conflict can also be examined in the
context of research into the effects of mass communication. The
limited knowledge available suggests that mass communication
ordinarily does not serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of
audience effects, but rather functions among and through "a nexus
of mediating factors and influences. ' 43 Seldom, if ever, is mass
communication a sole cause, but often it is a contributory agent
which serves to reinforce pre-existing conditions. However, there
may be certain residual situations in which mass communication
seems to produce direct effects. 4 But the efficacy of mass com-
munication, either as a contributory agent or as an agent of direct
effect, is determined by the characteristics of the media and their
messages, or by the communication situation, including for example,
aspects of textual organization, the nature of the sources and medium,
41. Millspaugh, Trial by Mass Media, in PUBLIC OPINION AND PROPAGANDA 113-114
(Katz ed. 1954).
42. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. State, 193 Md. 800, 67 A.2d 497 (1949).
43. KLAPPER, THE EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATION 8 (1960).
44. Ibid.
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and the existing climate of public opinion.4 5 This might suggest
that we could profitably examine such variables as the emotional
tone of crime reports, the extent of the mass medium's circulation,
the depth of its readership or listenership, and the nature of the
crime itself.
Reinforcement may be abetted by (1) predispositions and the
related processes of selective exposure, selective perception, and
selective retention; (2) the groups, and the norms of the groups
to which the audience members belong; (3) interpersonal dissemi-
nation of the content of communications; (4) the exercise of opinion
leadership; and (5) the nature of mass media in a "free enterprise"
society.46
Susceptibility toward an attitude change may be inversely pro-
portional to the intensity of the initial attitude.4 7  Communication
content may be more effective in influencing public opinion on new
or unstructured issues.4 8 Communication may be extremely effective
in creating opinions on matters about which the audience is unlikely
to have prior opinions, and may be capable of "inoculating" audience
members, rendering them more resistant to later communications
suggesting a contrary view.49 Fear appeals may readily influence
opinions.50 A prestige source may greatly facilitate persuasion, and
a source featured by the media may gain in prestige. It is a matter
of "common observation that the media are regarded by many in
their audience with considerable awe, and that media recognition
or espousal ipso facto confers a degree of prestige upon the concept,
person, or agency so recognized." 51 An attitude frequently changes
from a subordinate to a dominant position when it is justified by the
authority of print. 52 Persuasive communication w h i c h explicitly
states conclusions is more likely to be effective than those which
allow audience members to draw their own conclusions. Action
recommendations, also, seem to be more likely followed as they
are specific and explicit.5
There is also evidence that in critical social situations the mass
media may play a more crucial role.5
45. Ibid.
46. Id. at 19.
47. Tannenbaum, Inita Attitude Toward Source and Concept as Factors in Attitude
Change Through Communication, 20 PUBLIC OPINION Q. 413 (1956).
48. Berelson, Communications and Public Opinion, in COMMUNICATION IN MODERN SO-
CIETY 496 (Schramm ed. 1948).
49. Kiapper, op. cit. supra note 40, at 60.
50. Janis & Feshbach, Effects of Fear-Arousing Communications, 48 J. ABNORMAL &
SOCIsi PSYCHOLOGY 78 (1958).
51. Lazarsfeld & Merton, Mass Communications, Popular Taste and Organized Social
Action, in THE COMMUNICATION OF IDEAS, at 104 (Bryson ed. 1943).
52. WAPLES, BERELSON & BRADSHAW, WHAT READING DOES TO PEOPLE (1940).
53. Klapper, op. cit. supra note 40, at 130. For a summary of psychological findings,
see BRADSHAW, PERSUASION (1959).
54. Cantril, The Invasion from Mars, in RE:ADINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 619 (New-
combe & Hartley eds. 1947), and Johnson, The "Phant om Anesthetist" of Mattoon: A
F'ield Study of Maas Hysteria, id. at 639.
'TRiAL By NEWSPAPER'
Wilbur Schramm suggests that the mass media place our broad
social environment in perspective, correlate society's responses to
this environment, and transmit the social heritage from one gener-
ation to another. They also affect the social mores by contributing
heroes and myths to the culture, and, by their power either to
mention or ignore, serve as arbiters of social status. And the media
assist the larger community in achieving some degree of consensus. 55
The sociological concept of a "two-step flow of communication, '"' 6
although it has been substantially refined and modified,57 posits
an indirect flow of information through groups via opinion leaders
and influentials who are inclined to expose themselves more frequent-
ly and more intensely than others to the mass media. The concept
implies a network of individuals socially interconnected in functional
groups 58 and reference groups 59 through which mass communica-
tions messages move in a patterned way; it rejects the notion of
an audience as a mass of discrete, unorganized individuals linked
directly to the media. The relay function of opinion leaders, however,
may be less important for the sort of bulletin news of high public
interest which is often received directly from the mass media.60
At the very least, these studies suggest that there is probably
no simple and direct cause-effect relationship between pre-trial and
trial press comment and jury verdicts-although the converse has
been held as a law by most Anglo-American courts. They have
looked "too much for the messages the media bear and too little
for the ways in which the audience actively participates and shapes
its experience of the media."' 61 At the same time, Joseph Klapper
warns that there is a danger in blindly minimizing the effects and
potentialities of mass communications: 1 2
In reaping the fruits of discovery that mass media
function amid a nexus of other influences, we must not
forget that the influences nevertheless differ. Mass media
55. Schramm, The Effects of Maess Communication: A Review, 26 JOURNALISM Q. 407(1949).
56. Katz, The Two-Step Flow of Communication: An Up-To-Date Report on a Hy-
pothesis, 21 PUBLIC OPINION Q. 61 (1957).
57. See Deutschmann & Danielson, Diffusion of Knowledge of the Major News Story,37 JOURNALISM Q. 345 (1960), Deutschmann & Pinner, A Field Investigation of the Two-
Stage Flow of Communication, unpublished paper delivered at the annual meeting of the
Association for Education in Journalism at Pennsylvania State University, August, 1960,
and Deutschmann, Viewing, Conversation, and Voting Intention, in THE GREAT DEBATES(Kraus ed. 1962). These studies suggest that initial mass media information on important
events goes directly to individuals and is not relayed to any great extent. See also ROGERS,
DIFFUSION AND INNOVATIONS 98-102 (1962). For a useful review of research in this area,
see Troldahl, A Field Experimental Test of a Modified "Two-Step Flow of Communication"
Model, a paper read at the annual meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism,
at the University of Nebraska, August, 1963.
58. SCHRAMM, THE PROCESS AND EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATION 360 (1954).
59. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 336 (1957).
60. Deutschmann & Danielson, op. cit. supra note 57, at 345. For one of the best resu-
mes of the sociological theory of mass communication, see Riley & Riley, Mass Com-
mnunications and the Social System, in SOCIOLOGY TODAY 537 (Merton, Brown & Cottrell
eds. 1959).
Riesman & Denney, Do the Mass Media "Escape" from Politicst, In READER IN
PUBLIC OPINION AND COMMUNICATION 327, 332 (2d. ed. Berelson & Janowitz 1953).
62. Klapper, op. cit. supra note 40, at 130.
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of communication possess various characteristics and capa-
bilities distinct from those of peer groups or opinion leaders.
They are, after all, media of mass communication, which
daily address tremendous cross-sections of the population
with a single voice.
Under different conditions and in other situations, the mass media
may be responsible for extensive, dramatic, and even dangerous
effects.
If a tentative conclusion may be ventured at this point, it is
that there is no empirical evidence to support the view that extensive,
or even irresponsible, press coverage of a court case destroys the
ability of jurors to decide the issue fairly. In the meantime the
problem is ripe for study, and until the law loses some of its sacro-
sanctity, and scientifically accumulated data is available, courts and
legislatures will have to act on little more than hunch and intuition.
Unfortunately, it is doubtful whether the courts, the press, and
the legislatures in concert can do much to neutralize prejudicial
predispositions of jurors to the point of making the criminal trial
completely antiseptic. Press comment appears to make its strongest
impression when conforming to stereotypes already in the public
mind. For this reason, such comment may follow community bias
as often as it instigates it. This would suggest that the press is
particularly obligated to exercise self-restraint and moral judgment
in cases involving atrocious sex crimes, especially where children
are the victims, in cases of espionage or treason, and in cases where
members of minority groups are before the court, for example,
Negroes in many communities. Here the newspaper may act as a
catalytic agent in a situation where there is already an acute
sensitivity and where community prejudices are already apparent.
In the meantime, the press does not intend to divorce itself
from the parade of crime and corruption in American life; and it
owes a duty to society not to remain silent if it believes the judicial
system has misused its power or has departed from a reasonable
concept of justice. Newspaper prying has led to the exposure of
corrupt judges, prosecutors, police officials and government officials,
and society can ill afford to be denied such information. 63
As a minimum, responsible segments of the press ask for a
systematic study of the free press-fair trial complex before either
legislation or an angry revival of the contempt power is imposed
upon it.
63. Editor & Publisher, Feb. 2, 1957, p. 48; id., Dec. 7, 1957, p. 13; id., Dec. 14, 1957,
P. 54; id., Dec. 21, 1957, P. 46; id., Dec. 28, 1957, P. 44; id., June 20, 1959, P. 15.
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SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
As a first step in shedding light on the vexing problem of "trial
by newspaper," exploratory studies are needed to formulate relevant
hypotheses consonant with social theory. The basic issue is whether
the right to a fair trial can be prejudiced by news reports. Apart
from what lawyers and judges may have concluded on this matter,
it is by no means a settled question in the social sciences. Prejudice
is said to occur when a juror's partiality is disturbed, when his
judgment of the issues before him is affected either for or against
any party to a trial by the intrusion of material that would not other-
wise reach him. 64 An impartial jury is one which knows nothing
about a case aside from what has been presented in evidence; or
one which, though it has been buffeted by outside information, is
able to disregard it and decide the case as if no such extraneous
knowledge was available.
I. Experiments. Pull real jurors from jury pools and have
them deliberate on recorded mock trials. Systematically vary the
exposure of different juries to news reports of varying intensities
(from the highly inflammatory to the highly responsible). The con-
trolled experiment is the most objective method of measuring the
effect of stimuli, an effect which may be either conscious or
unconscious. Although an artificial situation, the experience of Jury
Project suggests that experimental juries take their task seriously
and behave much like actual juries.
If we are to attain a distribution of unbiased verdicts, the experi-
mental trial will have to be one about which our jurors have heard
nothing. Some sets of juries will then be exposed to news clippings,
telecasts and broadcasts commenting on the case and then compared
with the "antiseptic" sets of juries to determine if their verdicts
are significantly different within a specified statistical confidence
level. Also, the evidence properly introduced at the mock trial
will have to be considerably less than conclusive, so that there is
a high probability that without the prejudicial material the defendant
would have been found not guilty. Ideally we would begin with a
case in which there is both a prior criminal record and a repudiated
confession, along with rather weak admissible evidence of the de-
fendant's guilt, and one in which the nature of the crime would stir
public emotions. A total of about 200 experimental trials would be
required to cover all aspects of the problem and permit a variation
in the intensity of the news material, the nature of the cases, and
the impact of judicial instructions.
64. Letter from Justice Bernard S. Meyer of the Supreme Court of the State of New
York to Professor Maurice Rosenberg, Director of Columbia University's Project for
Effective Justice, Nov. 26, 1962.
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A more complex experiment, and one more difficult to plan
and perform, could be constructed in the following manner:
ExperI- Experi-
mental mental Control Control II
Group I Group II I (real jury)
1. Pre-test of attitudes based
pre-trial news reports X1 no X", no
2. Read news reports of
trial yes yes no no
3. Post-test of attitudes X2 X2" X2"' X2""
The two experimental groups and control group I would ideally
spend as much time in the courtroom during the course of the trial
as the real jury. These three groups would also deliberate, under
substantially the same conditions as the real jury, and reach a
verdict. The eight-study model is necessitated by the fact that the
real jury could not be given the pre-test and would be admonished
by the judge not to follow press reports of the trial. The pre-test
would gauge the effect of the pre-trial publicity; the post-test would
seek to measure the cumulative effect of the pre-trial and trial
publicity. Such an experiment would undoubtedly require the consent
and co-operation of the court. Its major advantage, assuming that
as many extraneous variables as possible could be controlled, would
be its validity; its major problem, the randomization of the sample
groups.
II. Interviews. Real jurors would be interviewed at the con-
clusion of a trial to determine what factors, including press reports,
influenced their decision. Interview responses could also be com-
pared with the same juror responses on voir dire examination to
measure the effectiveness of this procedure in avoiding prejudice.
The weakness of this technique, of course, is that we are not certain
that we can rely on juror testimony, especially in cases which have
received wide publicity. Random samples of jury pool members
could be interviewed immediately before and immediately after the
same trial, but before the return of a verdict, to measure community
sentiment on guilt or innocence and to compare with the interviews
of the actual jurors.
Interview schedules could also be designed to solicit the opinions
of judges, lawyers, crime reporters, and police officials as to their
estimates of the effects of news reports in either impairing or serving
the administration of justice.
III. Content Analysis. Content analysis could be used to com-
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pare the transcript of a notorious trial with the full news coverage
of the trial in (a) a newspaper tending to sensationalize the proceed-
ings, and (b) a newspaper tending to provide careful, accurate and
responsible coverage. This technique could also be used to check
the pre-trial coverage of a criminal case in a single newspaper, or
a number of newspapers in order to determine (a) source of
information, e.g., percentage from court officials, next of kin, and
newspaper reporters per se, and (b) the general tenor of material
from each source.
In conjunction with juror interviews, content analysis could also
be used in the same sample of jurisdictions to measure the actual
extent and content of news coverage, particularly in advance of the
trial. This would permit the cross-analysis of two sets of data: the
actual coverage, and the perceived coverage as reported by the
jurors. This would tell us something about the kinds of cases where
press "contamination" of prospective jurors is most frequent; and
it would also provide some idea of the relative effect of varying
degrees and kinds of coverage on the minds of jurors.
IV. Participant Observation. As a cross-check a trained re-
searcher would involve himself with police, news reporters, and
prosecutors at the outset of a criminal case. He would keep track
of the origin and flow of information, and accumulate a file of media
reports. Another participant observer would follow the trial and
compare the daily reports in the mass media with the proceedings
in court, noting information denied to the jury but available in the
print or broadcast media. He would also report prejudicial infor-
mation revealed to the jury but not disseminated through the media.
The above research recommendations are contained in my
doctoral dissertation, 5 in a report prepared for the National Con-
ference of State Trial Judges by the Bureau of Applied Social
Research and the Graduate School of Journalism Project for Effective
Justice at Columbia University,6 and in a proposal submitted to
The Brookings Institution.67
Beyond the immediate objectives of these research proposals
loom the questions: how effective are existing procedural remedies;
and is there evidence to support legislation which would restrict
crime news and court reporting or. otherwise limit the freedom of
the press? There is a new ring of urgency to these questions: "The
66. Gillmor, "Trial by Newspaper": The Constitutional Conflict between Free Press
and Fair Trial in English and American Law (unpublished dissertation, University Micro-films No. 62-1781). See also Gillmor, Free Press versus Fair Trial: A New Era, 41
JOURNALISM Q. 27 (1964).
66. The Effects of News Media On Jury Verdicts: Examination of the Problem and
a Proposal, study prepared for the National Conference of State Trial Judges by the
Bureau of Applied Social Research and the Graduate School of Journalism Project for
Effective Justice Columbia University, May 4, 1964.
67. The Brookings Institution, Government Studies, Mass Media Coverage of Govern-
mental Processes: Project Proposal (1964).
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burden of insuring that appropriate action is taken to establish
ethical standards of conduct for the news media must also be borne
. . . by State and local governments, by the bar, and ultimately by
the public. The experience in Dallas during November 22-24 is a
dramatic affirmation of the need for steps to bring about a proper
balance between the right of the public to be kept informed and the
right of the individual to a fair and impartial trial. ' '6 8
68. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN
F. KENNEDY 242 (1964).
